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NOTE
Taking Physicians Out of the Straitjacket1: Defending




There is a new frontier in the legal battle over access to abortion. Forty years
after Roe v. Wade,3 litigation and regulation concerning abortion-related services
remain hotly contested and unsettled, as parties continue to challenge and expand
on the central holding of the landmark case. While historically much of the
litigation in this area has focused on the undue burden that certain state and federal
regulations may place on a woman's constitutional rights, the shifting landscape of
abortion legislation has presented a new issue and a new challenge in the modern
era. Because many recently enacted regulations require the woman's physician to
disseminate certain information as an aspect of obtaining informed consent,
opponents claim these laws violate the treating physician's freedom of speech rights
by compelling doctors to circulate and speak to information with which they may
not agree.' These challenges center on an area of the law left unclear by Casey, in
which the Court explicitly upheld a state's right to compel physician speech and
regulate the physician-patient interaction to serve the government's public health
interest so long as the disclosures contained "truthful, nonmisleading information."5
' Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976) ("To ascribe more
meaning [to informed consent and mandatory disclosures] than [the giving of information to the patient
as to the procedure and the consequences] might well confme the attending physician in an undesired
and uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his profession.").
2 J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Kentucky College of Law, B.A., Government, 2012, Centre
College. The author would like to sincerely thank Professor Nicole L. Huberfeld for her guidance
throughout the writing process. The author would also like to thank her family and friends for their
love, support, and advice.
3 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This case serves as a landmark decision in which the Supreme
Court first enunciated a woman's right to abortion services, grounded in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 153-54. While the Court's trimester framework for understanding when
and how the state could regulate these services was overturned in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court explicitly noted that "the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be
retained and once again reaffirmed." Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 869-
70 (1992). These two cases form the framework of the modem jurisprudence concerning access to
abortion services.
4 See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 572 (5th Cir.
2012); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 733 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc);
Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 587-88 (M.D.N.C. 2014); Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F. Supp.
2d 451, 457 (W.D. Ky. 2000); Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177, 1218 (VA.D. Wis. 1997).
5 Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
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The Court did not speak to what further analysis underlies the determination of
when compelled disclosures are truthful and nonmisleading, and federal courts have
subsequently followed suit, giving this standard sparse treatment and deferring to
the legislature on the fact-finding associated with the regulations.
Because this treatment can ultimately result in an infringement upon physician
free speech rights, this Note seeks to give context to the "truthful and not
misleading" standard implemented by the Court, arguing that by drawing on other
jurisprudence from the healthcare community and compelled speech challenges, the
courts can provide more appropriate guidelines for regulating physician speech and
can remedy this constitutional violation. Part I of this Note explores the current
state of the law on compelled speech in the context of the physician-patient
relationship and the way the courts have treated the "truthful and not misleading"
standard. This part will point to the potential problems and inconsistencies that
have arisen from the current state of the law. Part II draws inspiration from the
medical community, commercial and professional speech jurisprudence, and false
advertising cases in an effort to provide a solution to issues created by the existing
body of law. Part III then utilizes this information and seeks to give substance to
the "truthful and not misleading" standard in this context to adequately protect
physicians' fundamental right to freedom of speech.
I. LEGISLATORS IN THE EXAM ROOM: AN INTRODUCTION TO STATE
REGULATION OF ABORTION THROUGH INFORMED CONSENT AND
COMPELLED DISCLOSURES
While the Supreme Court upheld Roe v. Wadds central holding and affirmed
the right of a woman to receive an abortion in Casey,6 the Court's opinion also
opened the door to a new route for state regulation of the procedure by upholding
the section of the Pennsylvania law requiring a woman to give her informed
consent to the procedure.7 In doing so, the Court overturned its own standards and
holdings from previous informed consent cases.' Formerly, when physicians
challenged informed consent mandates as violations of their freedom of speech, the
6 Id. at 846.
' See id. at 881-82; see also 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (West, Westlaw
through the 2015 Reg. Sess. Acts 1 to 39). Under the statute, a physician must orally inform the woman
of: "(i) [t]he nature of the proposed procedure or treatment and of those risks and alternatives to the
procedure or treatment that a reasonable patient would consider material to the decision of whether or
not to undergo the abortion[,] (ii) [t]he probable gestational age of the unborn child at the time the
abortion is to be performed, [and] (iii) [t]he medical risks associated with carrying her child to term." §
3205(a)(1).
' See Sonia M. Suter, The Politics ofInformation: Informed Consent in Abortion and End-of-Life
Decision Making, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 20 (2013) ("Casey accepted as constitutional many informed
consent mandates that earlier decisions had found constitutionally infirm."); e.g., Thornburgh v. Am.
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760-62 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 443-44 (1983); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 67 (1976).
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courts looked to whether disclosures were "directly material to any medically
relevant fact" or whether the disclosure's purpose was only to confuse or punish the
woman or to heighten her anxiety.'0 Casey explicitly overruled this standard,
broadening the range of allowable information and inviting states to mandate
similar disclosures, so long as the information is truthful and not misleading.1
The Court's decision in Casey thus both lays the groundwork for physicians to
bring future claims by noting the free speech rights at stake ("[tio be sure, the
physician's First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated"), 2 and for future
state regulations by expressing the state interest at hand ("but only as part of the
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.").13
Both physician-challengers and state-regulators have seized upon this language in
subsequent years.
A. Freedom of Speech Interests and Concepts at Play
The Supreme Court has made clear that the right not to speak is within the
protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." The government generally
cannot control what a person sees, reads, or says.15 Citizens have generally been
protected against government-compelled speech under the theory that such
compulsion would violate freedom of speech principles by requiring "an individual,
as part of his daily life ... to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an
ideological point of view he finds unacceptable." 6 In mandatory disclosure and
compelled speech cases, opponents cite the negative effects such regulations can
have on personal autonomy 7 and liberty of thought.'" Under this reasoning, the
Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1021 (1st Cir. 1981).o Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 882; see also Suter, supra note 8, at 21-22.
12 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
13 Id. (citation omitted).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech...
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (ruling that the First Amendment is incorporated
against and constrains state government action via the Fourteenth Amendment); see also W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring) ("The right of freedom of
thought . . . as guaranteed by the Constitution against State action includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all .... ").
15 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234,245 (2002).16 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
17 See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Emodional Compelled Disclosures, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 357,
360 (2014) ("State-mandated speech implicates the individual autonomy of the compelled speaker, as
the right to control your speech can be violated as much by being forced to speak as by being silenced.").15 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (noting that protection against compelled speech preserves "the sphere
of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve
from all official control").
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United States court system has frequently invalidated legislation that forces
speakers to recite the views of a third party or the government. 9
Although the Court recognized the First Amendment implications of informed
consent laws within the Casey opinion, the last several years have seen a
proliferation of cases applying this concept to regulations and disclosure
requirements upon physicians. 2' While lower court opinions (both pre- and post-
Casey) have dealt with these challenges using a variety of frameworks, the Casey
opinion indicates that the Supreme Court will protect physician speech as
professional or commercial speech 2 ' and thus will consider these challenges under a
different analysis than other restrictions on speech.22 To pass constitutional muster,
the challenged restriction must regulate lawful and not misleading speech and must
be "not more extensive than is necessary" to serve a substantial government
interest.2 By emphasizing a state's important interest in regulating the medical
field and "in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed,"24 Casey and related cases
indicate that the decisive prong of the Central Hudson test in these challenges will
be whether speech is "truthful and not misleading."' However, in reality the
truthful and not misleading standard has been given little treatment. The slight
consideration and nonexistent treatment of this standard originates in Casey itself,
where the Court essentially assumed that the information contained in the
compelled disclosures was truthful and nonmisleading. 26
B. The States React: Abortion Regulations and Informed Consent Statutes
After the Casey Decision
States (and the federal government) were quick to take advantage of the
pathway the Court left open in the Casey decision by moving to enact their own
"informed consent" statutes. Legislation and regulations related to abortion services
"9 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1986); Wooley, 430
U.S. at 715. For a fisler discussion of the breadth of compelled speech legislation and jurisprudence, see
Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey and a Woman s Right to Know: Ultrasounds, Informed
Consent, and the First Amendment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 595, 617-19 (2012).
o See supra note 4 (listing cases dealing with compelled speech and mandated disclosures for
physicians and healthcare providers).
21 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992); see also Daniel
Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social
Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 834-35 (1999); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A
First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 939-40 (2007).
' See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(discussing a court's review analysis in commercial speech cases); see also Halberstam, supra note 21, at
779.
23 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; see also Lorilard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553-56
(2001).
24 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-83.
See id. at 882, 884.
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have surged in the past several years.27 From 2011 to 2013, states around the
country enacted more abortion restriction laws than had been enacted in the entire
preceding decade,28 and in 2013 alone, seventy anti-abortion measures were
enacted in twenty-two states. 29 Federal legislation (though unsuccessful thus far)
was introduced as early as 2004, though not voted on until 2006, with the Unborn
Child Pain Awareness Act, 0 and as recently as 2014 and 2015."' Anti-abortion
advocates see this as the new frontier for limiting abortion access-a way to shut
down some clinics and ultimately eliminate such services.3 2
This trend has been especially pronounced in relation to regulations concerning
informed consent. As of March 1, 2016, thirty-eight states have implemented laws
mandating that physicians provide certain counseling and information to a woman
seeking an abortion as part of seeking her informed consent.33 Thirty of these states
mandate the specific information that must be included, while eight mandate that
the abortion-specific requirements generally follow informed consent principles. 34
Information contained in these disclosures varies from state to state and can include
details about the procedure, the gestational age of the fetus, and fetal
development 3 -- categories which exactly mirror the language used in the Casey
holding and the Pennsylvania law at issue in that case. 36
27 Erik Eckholm, Access to Abortion Falling as States Pass Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2014,
at Al, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/04/us/women-losing-access-to-abortion-as-opponents-gain-
ground-in-state-legislatures.html.
2" Heather D. Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, A Surge of State Abortion Restrictions Puts
Providers--and the Women They Serve--in the Crosshairs, GtfTMACHER POL'Y REV., Winter 2014,
at 9, 9-10.
29 Id. at 9.
' Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2006, H.R. 6099, 109th Cong. (2006). The bill failed by a
vote of 250-162 in the House. Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act Loses Vote in House, CATHOLIC
NEWS AGENCY (Dec. 7, 2006),http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/unborn child_painawareness act loses vote in_houseb
see also Katherine E. Engelman, Fetal Pain Legislation: Protection Against Pain is Not an Undue
Burden, 10 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 279, 280 n.6 (2007).
31 Heartbeat Informed Consent Act, H.R. 5551, 113th Cong. (2014); Elise Viebeck, GOP
Relaunches Push to Ban Late-Term Abortions, THE HILL Gan. 6, 2015, 5:34 PM),
http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/228686-gop-relaunches-abortion-push (reporting on the GOP's
renewed effort to introduce legislation mandating disclosure of fetal pain information to women seeking
abortions).
32 Gregory H. Wilmoth, Abortion, Public Health Policy, and Informed Consent Legislation, 48 J.
SOC. ISSUES, no. 3, 1992, at 1, 11 (quoting THOMAS A. GLESSNER, ACHIEVING AN ABORTION-
FREE AMERICA BY 2001, at 136-37 (1990)); see also Eckholm, supra note 27, at Al.
" Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTITMACHER INST.: STATE POLICIES IN
BRIEF (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibMWPA.pdf.
34 Id.
35 Id.
' Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992); see also 18 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (West, Wesdaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess. Acts 1 to 39).
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The Casey decision affords states the ability to regulate and mandate informed
consent provisions through their power to regulate the healthcare field, 37 and
commentators have pointed to language in the Gonzales v. Carhart decision as
further augmenting state power in this area.3" In reality, state laws seem to have
outgrown the broad categories of required information seen in the Pennsylvania
law at issue in Casey, now mandating that the physician dispense much more
specific and detailed "facts" 39 to the woman as part of achieving the requisite
informed consent. 40 These laws have led to a variety of challenges from physicians
on free speech grounds under the theory that legislatures have overstepped the
Casey test and are no longer limiting mandated information to those disclosures
that are truthful and not misleading disclosures.4' Such laws include those requiring
physicians to dispense information concerning the purported link between breast
cancer and abortion, the ability of the fetus to feel pain, the long-term mental
health consequences to women after receiving abortion services,42 and those
requiring that a woman be informed that "personhood begins at conception."43
Several lower federal courts have struck down many laws for requiring the
dissemination of information that was potentially misleading or not truthful, but
almost all of these laws have been subsequently upheld in federal circuit appeals
courts.' These lower federal court decisions are indicative of the nationwide
treatment of (and confusion and disagreement on) this issue.
One of the most noteworthy examples of a physician compelled speech
challenge came in response to a South Dakota informed consent statute, which, in
part, required that a physician inform a woman seeking an abortion that the
procedure would "terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human
being," and would terminate her existing relationship with that human being.4' The
lower federal court held that these provisions went beyond the information
allowable under Casey and contained the state's views on the "unsettled medical,
" See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (noting that a physician's free speech rights are only implicated as
they relate to the practice of medicine, an area "subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the
State.").
" See Jack M. Balkin, The Big News About Gonzales v. Carhart-t's the lnformed Consent,
Stupid, BALKINIZATION (Apr. 19, 2007, 2:50 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/04/big-news-
about-gonzales-v-carhart.html.
" As will be explained later in this Note, many of the "facts" contained in disclosures under these
initiatives are often not based in fact at all. See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
o See, e.g., supra note 4 (listing cases challenging such laws).
41 See, e.g., Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 588-89 (M.D.N.C. 2014).
42 An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTITMACHER INST.: STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF (May 1,
2016), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib-OAL.pdf.
4 Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 33.
Danielle Lang, Truthful But Misleading? The Precarious Balance of Autonomy and State
Interests in Casey and Second-Generation Doctor-Patient Regulation, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1353,
1392-402 (2014) (discussing the treatment of certain informed consent laws in federal courts).
41 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess.).
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philosophical, theological, and scientific issue" of whether a fetus constituted a
human being.46
This decision was eventually overturned by the Eight Circuit, which enunciated
the familiar Casey standard in its decision by noting that the plaintiffs could only
succeed in their compelled speech claim by showing that the mandatory disclosure
was untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant.47 While the Eighth Circuit recognized
that, in isolation, the statute's language concerning the termination of "the life of a
whole, separate, unique, living human being" could seem misleading or
ideological, 8 in this particular instance the court found the mandated disclosure
withstood the Casey test because "human being" was defined for purposes of the
statute to include "an individual living member of the species of Homo sapiens...
during [its] embryonic [or] fetal age[]." 49 In the court's opinion, this language made
the disclosure both truthful and relevant.5 0 Subsequent litigation has followed a
similar pattern to that of Rounds, though the exact information in the mandated
disclosures differs from state to state.5 1
Until recently, there have been few successful physician free speech challenges
to informed consent statutes. However, in 2014, the Fourth Circuit upheld a lower
court's ruling that a North Carolina informed consent statute violated the treating
physician's free speech rights.52 Rather than invalidating the law under the Casey
truthful and not misleading test, the Fourth Circuit focused on the state interest at
play and the means used by the state. 3 While this decision still accorded little
treatment to the truthful and nonmisleading standard and developed few
guideposts for future courts to determine why and how such a statute constitutes a
violation, the court did refer to the importance of considering traditional informed
consent principles in these decisions and of placing some safeguards on a
physician's free speech rights.54
' Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 887 (D.S.D. 2005),
vacated, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).
47 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734-35 (8th Cir. 2008).
s See id. at 735.
4 See id. at 735-36 (omissions in the original) (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-1 (West,
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess., Exec. Order 15-1, and S. Ct. R 15-16).
50 See id.
51 See supra note 4 (listing cases dealing with requirements placed on physicians and healthcare
providers).
52 Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 255-56 (4th Cit. 2014) (holding that an informed consent
requirement that the physician take, display, and explain ultrasound photographs to a woman seeking an
abortion violated the physician's free speech rights by compelling ideological speech in a way that
overreached the important state interests involved), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (mem.) (2015). In
upholding the lower court's finding that certain provisions of North Carolina's informed consent statute
violated the challenging physician's rights to free speech, the Fourth Circuit became the first appellate
level court to recognize such a violation. See id. at 248-49 (disagreeing with approaches of the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits in reviewing cases about the constitutionality of abortion regulations under the First
Amendment).
s See id. at 250.
s See id. at 251-52.
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C. The Subsequent Lack of Protection for Physician Free Speech Rights
Under the Casey standard, the government may compel disclosures in the
context of the physician-patient relationship only when the information contained
within the disclosures is truthful and not misleading. 5 Since the courts generally
find that these laws serve a compelling state interest and are narrowly tailored (the
other two prongs of the Central Hudson test regarding commercial speech
regulations 56), the truthful and not misleading standard is often the only defense
against infringements on the doctor's free speech rights.
Ideally, this standard protects doctors from being compelled to act as
ideological vehicles for the state or to say anything against their beliefs or values.
However, under the current system, courts do not often look carefully at whether
each compelled piece of information is in line with the Casey standard. States are
thus able to mandate disclosures that distort and compel physician speech by
including disdosures that are not entirely true, or are true but are also misleading.
As previously noted, there has been much activity in the lower federal court
system concerning whether a law regulating physician speech violates a medical
provider's freedom against government compelled speech. However, there has been
little discussion regarding the considerations that should go into determining
whether a regulation constitutes an impermissible intrusion on this right. By giving
such cursory treatment to this issue, the courts are undervaluing, and giving little
protection to, the physician's freedom of speech rights. While all of these required
disclosures force physicians to become vehicles of the state, such actions only
become problematic and violate a physician's free speech rights when the action
compels the physician to make statements that may not be truthful and may be
misleading to those who hear them. The courts' failure to look underneath the
legislative findings and test the factual statements required under mandatory
disclosure laws puts the physician in a straitjacket and undermines his or her right
to freedom of speech and to avoid being a mouthpiece for the state in practice. 7
The best way to see potential problems caused by an overly deferential standard
in this area is to look to some of the laws and disclosures that have been upheld as
truthful and nonmisleading by federal appellate courts. Of the twenty-five states
that require certain disclosures regarding the risks of abortion, Guttmacher
Institute"' has posited that four states inaccurately portray the risks to a woman's
" Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
56 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
17 See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976).
"' The Guttmacher Institute has offices in New York and Washington and is staffed by
"demographers, social scientists, public policy analysts, editors, writers, communications specialists, and
financial and technical personnel," all committed to "[a]dvancing sexual and reproductive health
worldwide through research, policy analysis and public education." The History of the Guttmacher
Institute, GUIrENMACHER INST. http://www.guttmacher.org/about/history.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2016).
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future fertility,59 five inaccurately assert a possible link between abortion and breast
cancer,6 0 and nine emphasize the negative emotional responses to the procedure,
rather than including the fidl range of potential emotional responses.61 Other
abortion-specific informed consent provisions include a requirement that the
woman seeking an abortion be told that personhood begins at conception (six
states),62 or that require the woman be given information that details the fetus'
ability to feel pain (twelve states).63 While the courts have upheld challenges to
almost all of these provisions, research shows that such provisions are based on
statements that are untrue, or for which there is no medical consensus. 64 In
response, many scientists and physicians have opposed these policies and the
related mandatory dispersal of such information in an informed consent context,
arguing that these disclosures work against informed consent and interfere with
adequate patient-physician interactions. 65
II. INFORMING CONSENT: GIVING CONTEXT TO THE TRUTHFUL AND NOT
MISLEADING STANDARD
To assure that physicians' free speech rights are protected against infringement,
the legal system must give context to the truthful and not misleading standard.
Disclosures under the Casey standard must be truthful-but what does truthful
entail, and what should courts look to when determining if mandated disclosures
meet that definition? According to Merriam-Webster's dictionary, truthful is
" Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 33 (listing Arizona, Kansas, South
Dakota, and Texas as states that inaccurately portray the risk to women's fertility).
o Id. (listing Alaska, Kansas, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Texas as states that inaccurately assert a
link between abortion and breast cancer).
61 Id. (listing Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
and West Virginia as states that misrepresent the range of emotional responses to abortion).
62 Id. (listing Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota as states that
tell women seeking abortion that personhood begins at conception).
63 Id. (listing Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah as states that include information on the ability of a fetus to
feel pain).
" See, e.g., Sharona Coutts & Sofia Resnick, How Shoddy Evidence Finds Its Way from State
Legislatures to the U.S. Supreme Court, RH REALITY CHECK, (Nov. 13, 2014, 11:56 AM)
http://rhreaitycheck.org/article/2014/11/13/shoddy-evidence-fmds-way-state-legislatures-u-s-
supreme-court!; see generally Chinud Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent:
The Medical Accuracy of State-Developed Abortion Counseling Materials, GUTrMACHER POL'Y
REV., Fall 2006, at 6, https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/O9/4/gpr090406.html (discussing
information on the medical and scientific inaccuracies in state laws).
61 See, e.g., Vignetta E. Charles et al., Abortion and Long-Term Mental Health Outcomes: A
Systematic Review of the Evidence, 78 CONTRACEPTION 436, 449 (2008) ("Programs and policies
based on claims derived from flawed research should be modified to reflect the most scientifically sound
literature."); Gail Erlick Robinson et al., Is There an "Abortion Trauma Syndrome"? Critiquing the
Evidence, 17 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 268, 276 (2009) ("To date, the published studies concluding
that abortion causes psychiatric illness have numerous methodological problems; since their conclusions
are questionable, they should not be used as a basis for public policy.").
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defined as "containing or expressing the truth,"66 while truth means "a judgment,
proposition, or idea that is true or accepted as true," or "being in accord with fact or
reality."67 These definitions become complicated in the legal arena, especially in
relation to scientific findings and personal beliefs. The truthful standard involves
further inquiry than a look into the dictionary. The additional requirement that
disclosures be "not misleading" is also not so easily defined.
Because the Casey standard plays so vital a role in preserving physicians' free
speech rights, this Note will now seek to give context to this standard, and to
propose a solution to the shortcomings of the current analysis. First, this Note
considers the Casey precedent in an effort to understand what information the
Court intended to allow in mandatory disclosures. Then, the Note discusses what
determinations should underlie the truthful and not misleading standard from the
Casey test by looking to the purposes and law concerning informed consent,
scientific and medical principles, and jurisprudence concerning false advertising and
emotional appeals. This Note will additionally discuss considerations of pre-Casey,
precedent and deference to the legislature in this area.
A. Clearer Look at the Casey Precedent
Although the Casey standard has already been discussed at length, giving
context to this standard in relation to modern state informed consent laws requires
a deeper and dearer look at the precedent itself. First, the provisions of the law
challenged in Casey are distinguishable from the informed consent provisions that
states have enacted in recent years. The Pennsylvania statute at issue in Casey
required the physician to speak to the gestational age of the fetus, the relevant
medical risks of abortion and childbirth, and to inform the woman about state
pamphlets concerning alternatives to abortion and medical benefits for prenatal
care and childbirth.6" This general information lines up with the type of
information that doctors are already required to give patients under the doctrine of
informed consent,69 and providing such information does not require the physician
to directly parrot the state's perspective. In fact, the only true state information
being compelled is contained in a pamphlet from the state that the doctor must
merely inform the woman of, and provide to her if requested.
The law that was at issue in Casey, then, differs markedly from those enacted
following the Court's decision. Many laws now require the physician to inform the
woman orally or in writing that human life begins at conception; ° that the abortion
66Truthfu1, MERRIAM WEBSTER (2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/truthful.
67 Truth, MERRIAM WEBSTER (2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/truth.
68 See 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(1)-(2) (West, Westlaw through the 2015
Reg. Sess. Acts 1 to 39).
69 See infra Part II.B; see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
7o See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(E) (West, Westlaw through the 2015 First Reg.
Sess.).
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"will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being;"7' that"objective scientific information shows that a fetus can feel pain at or before twenty
(20) weeks of postfertilization age;"7 2 and that risks to her fertility,73 of breast
cancer,74 and of suicide or other serious mental health issues may exist.75 When
laws contain these specific, required disclosures and do not leave room for physician
discretion as to what is medically accurate, they depart from Casey, go outside
traditional informed consent notions,76 and compel physician speech-that is,
unless the laws and disclosures are truthful and not misleading.7 Thus, these
specific, mandated disclosures should be subjected to judicial oversight in relation
to their impact on and potential infringement of physician free speech.7"
B. Drawing Inspiration from Science, General Informed Consent
Jurisprudence, and Other Healthcare Law Contexts
Scientific principles, general informed consent law, and the regulation of other
healthcare contexts can provide an important basis for determining when a law is
both truthful and not misleading. In informing the truthful and not misleading
standard, disclosures should be compared to the current scientific consensus. While
the Supreme Court has made clear that the required disclosures may go outside the
realm of medically necessary and can be in addition to the information traditionally
required under informed consent,7 9 a look to medical ethics and the way the law
71 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(b)(5) (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess.); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess., Exec. Order 15-
1, S. Ct. R. 15-16).
72 IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(G); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(b)(6)
(espousing a similar requirement).
71 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(a)(3); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(iv).
74 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(a)(3).
71 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(i-ii).
76 Suter, supra note 8, at 28-29.
'7 Cf Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
7 In fact, precedent and case law surrounding Casey call for this. See infra Part II.D; Thornburgh
v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 761-62 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 443-44 (1983). In Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v.
Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D.S.D. 2011), the court applied strict scrutiny after holding that the
information contained in the disclosures was false or misleading. Id. at 1072. The lower court in Rounds
actually noted that Casey precedent required the district court to make preliminary determinations
concerning the "objective scientific and medical accuracy of the statements" in disclosures. Planned
Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716, 723 (8th Cir. 2006). Additionally, the Court
in Gonzales v. Carhart specifically stated that the Court retained this independent constitutional duty to
review the legislature's findings. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007).
79 See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159-60 (stating that additional information can be required to "ensure
so grave a choice is well informed" and to prevent women from later coming to regret their decision);
Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 223, 254, 256-57 (2009) ("The Court recognized that the law of informed
consent generally does not require disclosure of every detail of a particular medical procedure ....
However, it was 'precisely this lack of information.., that is of legitimate concern to the State."').
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treats informed consent in other contexts helps to inform notions of what
information is truthful and not misleading within the context of compelled
physician disclosures. Additionally, because much of the information contained in
mandatory informed consent laws involves unsettled science, courts must also look
to the way these issues are treated in other medical contexts.
1. Informed Consent in the Medical Field-Current law and medical ethics
require doctors to obtain a patient's informed consent to any procedure. "[A]
requirement that a doctor give a woman certain information as part of obtaining
her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional purposes, no different from a
requirement that a doctor give certain specific information about any medical
procedure.""° According to Casey, then, courts should begin their inquiry into
whether mandated disclosures are truthful and not misleading by determining
whether the information fits within the purposes and law concerning informed
consent in other contexts.
The doctrine of informed consent has a long history, but its modern conception
is generally expressed as a focus on patient autonomy, as seen in Canterbury v.
Spence." Under this conception, the three key elements of proper informed
consent are: information concerning the risks of the proposed treatment; the viable
alternative treatments, if any, and the likely outcomes in the absence of treatment. 2
Some jurisdictions have also required that patients be given information about the
nature of the procedure and/or the procedure's rate of success, though some
scholars argue that such requirements are subsumed within Canterburys three
categories 3 Doctors must communicate this necessary information, and the patient
should comprehend all information before consenting. 4 Thus, while the modern
standard for informed consent is technically patient-centric (in that it calls not just
for the delivery of information, but also the patient's autonomous consent after
understanding the risks)," there is an important role for the doctor as well.
The American Medical Association ("AMA") has issued ethics opinions that
reflect the modem notion of informed consent and expand upon the physician's
role. Under the AMA's guidelines, physicians must accurately present medical
facts, must make recommendations in accordance with "good medical practice,"
'o Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
81 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
8 Id. at 787-88.
" Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent, Deference,
and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM.J. GENDER &L. 111, 112 n.5 (2008).
"See Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Research, Report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,195 (Apr. 18, 1979), available at
http://archive.hhs.gov/ohrp/documents/19790418.pdf.
' Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780.
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and must tailor the information they provide to "the preferences and needs of
individual patients." s6 This is also reflected in Canterbury.
[o]f necessity, the content of the disclosure rests in the first
instance with the physician. Ordinarily, it is only he who is in the
position to identify particular dangers; always he must make a
judgment.. . as to whether and to what extent revelation to the
patient is called for.87
Casey also contemplated this formulation of informed consent. There, the law
at issue contained an exemption from the required disclosures law for situations in
which a physician believed the disclosure would adversely affect the patient's
physical or mental state, allowing the doctor to maintain some control and some
autonomy.8 8
Informed consent jurisprudence and its rationale can thus provide the court
with some guideposts for understanding whether information is truthful and not
misleading and whether mandated disclosures violate the physician's free speech
rights. Disclosures must have some relation to the three categories of information
traditionally required under informed consent law and must leave to the physician
some discretion to tailor information to the particular patient. While abortion
disclosures should rest neatly within the general informed consent requirements of
the state, they should also be complete statements of the relevant information,
noting both the risks of the procedure and the risks of a choice not to undergo the
procedure.
2. Help from Other Healthcare Law Contexts-Informed consent
jurisprudence is not the only source of guidance concerning what information
should be covered in required disclosures. It is also helpful to look to other areas of
law and the regulation of healthcare. In this area, medical malpractice jurisprudence
and the theory of evidence-based medicine can provide important considerations.
2(a). The Medical Field and Malpractice Law-Courts first look to the medical
standard of care (a higher standard of care that considers whether the defendant
acted in conformity with the common practice of his or her profession and
reasonable physicians in the same or similar positions) in evaluating malpractice
86 Opinion 8.08-nformed Consent, AMA CODE OF MED. ETHICS (last updated November
2006), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/opinion808.page.
" Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787. While the government does have some room under this model to
restrict the doctor's dialogue in the context of abortion services under Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
(1991), this finding rested on the assumption that the regulations would not "require[] a doctor to
represent as his own any opinion that he does not in fact hold." Id. at 200.
88 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883-84 (1992).
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claims. 9 However, courts give physicians additional flexibility when there are "two
schools of thought" on a treatment or medical issue, or when there is no medical
unanimity on the issue. 90 This standard has been applied to issues of medical
malpractice based on failure to obtain informed consent in contexts other than
abortion,91 and could be informative in this specialized context as well.
Under the "two schools of thought" approach, unsettled or debatable
information does not necessarily have to be disclosed, and the courts defer greatly
to the physician's discretion in this area; oftentimes, the courts do not require any
statement on the issue in either direction. 92 Some courts and medical ethics experts
actually reject the idea that the patient should be fully informed of both schools of
thought or that physicians should be required to share the details of both schools of
thought with the patient, finding that discussion of the controversy can be
confusing and unhelpful when there is no medical certainty on which to base the
disclosures.9 This rule also notes that when there is scientific consensus on a
medical issue, the physician cannot suggest that there is uncertainty.94
This treatment is important for informing the truthful and nonmisleading
standard-its instruction can guide the court in considering how scientific fact is
presented. When mandating disclosures, the legislature should consider whether
there are two schools of thought on an issue or whether scientific consensus has
been achieved to such certainty that it will not confuse or mislead the hearer. Since
many of the laws recently passed by legislatures include language on scientific
consensus, it is important for the courts to look to the scientific communities'
opinion on the information and whether that opinion is settled consensus or is still
subject to active debate.
2(b). Evidence-Based Medicine Standards and the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act-The medical field's developing theory of "evidence-based
medicine" can also lend important guidance to courts in determining what is
accurate, nonmisleading information in the informed consent process for abortion
services. While evidence-based medicine has been working its way into courts for
years in relation to the applicable standard of care and the admissibility and
credibility of expert evidence in relation to the Daubert test,9 it was also recently
integrated into our legal system in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
s See Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
o Suter, supra note 8, at 52-53.
91 See, e.g., Gala v. Hamilton, 715 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Pa. 1998) (noting that this is the standard
applied in Pennsylvania) (quotingJones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 964 (1992)).
92 Suter, supra note 8, at 53.
93 See id.
94 Id.
' See Thomas A. Robinson, Robinson on Tension Between Evidence-Based Medicine and
Clinical-Based Medicine, 2014 EMERGING ISSUES 7240 (uly 29, 2014). The Daubert test aims to
allow only scientific evidence that is reliable and relevant into trial court considerations. Id.; see also
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589-95 (1993).
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(PPACA), which includes a discussion of evidence-based medicine and patient-
decision support tools. 96
Evidence-based medicine was initially created to establish more uniform
standards for physicians during medical treatment and diagnosis.97 Essentially, it
seeks to combine the current best clinical research evidence with a doctor's clinical
expertise and patient values.98 This includes emphasizing: (1) clinical research that
discusses the safety, efficacy, and effectiveness of certain treatments; (2) the doctor's
ability to apply these studies to an individual patient's care based on the doctor's
prior experience and expertise; and (3) the patient's unique preferences, concerns,
and expectations.99 While the discussion of these standards in the PPACA comes
within the section of the law aimed at bettering healthcare quality by "facilitat[ing]
shared decisionmaking"1°° and concerns the federal funding requirements for
materials provided to patients, these standards can also provide an important
touchstone to the consideration of what is truthful and nonmisleading.'0 '
Patient decision aids are defined by the Act as tools that help patients in
understanding and deciding "what treatments are best for them based on their
treatment options, scientific evidence, circumstances, beliefs, and preferences."0 2
This definition reflects many of the same aims and principles as the truthful and
not misleading standard-the difference being that this law further defines what
should be included in those decisions. This deeper explanation can lend helpful
context to what courts should consider in determining whether information
contained in disclosures is truthful and not misleading. Under the PPACA, patient
decision aids:
(B) shall present up-to-date clinical evidence about the risks and
benefits of treatment options in a form and manner that is age-
appropriate and can be adapted for patients, caregivers, and
authorized representatives from a variety of cultural and
96 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36(b)(1) (2014); see also Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safekt The
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1727, 1765-67 (2011).
17 David L. Sackett et al., Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn't: It's About
Integrating Individual Clinical Expertise and the Best External Evidence, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 71, 71-72
(1996).
" SHARON E. STRAUS ET. AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: HOW TO PRACTICE AND
TEACH EBM 1 (3d ed. 2005).
99 Id.
'0 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36 (titled "Program to facilitate shared decisionmaking").
101 It is important to state here that this Note is not concerned with the legislative intent of this
specific Act in relation to the funding or provision of abortion services, as the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act does not allow federal funding to go to abortion services in any way. See Coverage
for Abortion Services and the ACA, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 19, 2014), http://kff.org/womens-
health-policy/issue-brief/coverage-for-abortion-services-and-the-aca/. Rather, this Note merely
attempts to show the potential applicability of evidence-based medicine standards to an additional and
separate area of the law.102 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36(b)(1).
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educational backgrounds to reflect the varying needs of
consumers and diverse levels of health literacy, [and]
(C) shall, where appropriate, explain why there is a lack of
evidence to support one treatment option over another.103
This standard is incredibly instructive regarding the way in which information
should be considered under the truthful and not misleading standard, as it ascribes
quantifiable standards to how scientific and medical data should be treated under
the law. Under this, courts should require that information contained in disclosures
be in line with up-to-date clinical findings and should ensure that disclosures
explain why there is a lack of evidence supporting a certain treatment option if
necessary to clarify and not mislead the patient.
C. Using Commercial and Professional Speech Cases and False Advertising
Precedent
Even if a compelled statement is truthful and not misleading under scientific
considerations, a court should also look to commercial or professional speech cases
and false advertising precedent to determine when certain statements by abortion
providers may be misleading. While this area of the law does not contain a basis in
science or medical provider rights, the precedent and the doctrines it can bring to
bear are directly relevant to the protection of physician free speech and the Casey
standard.
In both commercial and professional speech cases and false advertising claims,
the court frequently looks to the effect the specific speech has on an audience when
making determinations about the potentially misleading nature of any information,
speech, or disclosure concerned. 1°4 Oftentimes, in commercial speech cases, the
court's justification relates to protecting the free flow of information to the
consumer (or the client/patient) as well as the rights of the speaker.0 5 The nature
of the relationship between a professional and client or an advertiser and advertisee
is one of recognized imbalance of information and sophistication, in which the
listener must often rely upon and trust in the speaker. 10 6 Because of this, legislatures
and courts largely concern themselves with protecting and regulating areas like
103 § 299b-36(d)(2)(B)-(C).
104 See, e.g., Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 224 (3d Cir. 1990).
105 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
o See, e.g., Opinion 10.015-The Patient-Physician Relationship, AMA CODE OF MED.
ETHICS (last updated December 2001), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-
resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinionlO105.page? ("The relationship between patient
and physician is based on trust and gives rise to physicians' ethical obligations to place patients' welfare
above their own self-interest and above obligations to other groups, and advocate for their patients'
welfare.").
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professional speech and advertising because of an interest in the transmission of
truthful and not misleading information to the receiver.'1 7
For example, false advertisement actions under the Lanham Act require the
plaintiff to establish, and the court to determine, whether the information
contained in the advertisement at issue is false or misleading.0' One of the most
important considerations undertaken by the court in these cases is an analysis of the
surrounding context of the disclosure-specifically, the audience and listeners
targeted by the advertisement.0 9 While the court often finds this information most
relevant to its determination when the targeted audience or hearer has sophisticated
or specialized knowledge concerning the advertisement or disclosure, 1 this
principle is still applicable in the opposite situation, when the intended audience
does not have any knowledge concerning the subject matter.
In fact, it is arguable that this consideration is even more relevant and more
important in determinations under abortion informed consent statutes and
physician free speech rights because the speaker (here, the compelled physician) is
assumed to be the party with sophisticated or specialized knowledge. 1 ' Professional
speech jurisprudence has recognized this in relation to the lawyer-client
relationship, noting that "because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal
services, misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other
advertising may be found inappropriate."" 2 While this statement deals specifically
with the legal services context, its principle is applicable to a larger professional
speech context as well.
Another important takeaway from this area of the law is the court's willingness
to consider the actual misleading effect of certain advertisements or speech.
Notable discussions of this occur in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
Supreme Court of Ohio,"' FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co,"4 and National
Commission on Egg Nutrition v. FTC."' In Zauderer, the Court upheld a
107 See e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
1 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2014); Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 902 F.2d at 224.
19 See Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 902 F.2d at 229 (citing Plough, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson Baby
Prods. Co., 532 F. Supp. 714, 717 (D. Del. 1982)).
110 Often, the court will be less likely to find information misleading when the audience has
knowledge that would allow them to understand that the information contained in potentially deceptive
statements is false. See id. at 229-30.
. See Halberstam, supra note 21, at 838; see also Opinion 10.015-The Patient-Physician
Relationship, supra note 104.
112 In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982) (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383
(1977).
113 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)
(requiring private attorneys to inform their clients that they might have to pay some added costs if they
lose their cases).
114 FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965) (holding that that the undisclosed use of a
prop or mock-up made of plexiglass to which sand had been applied in a television commercial, which
showed the application of shaving cream to what appeared to be sandpaper and razor shaving the
substance dean was a material deceptive practice)."' Nat'l Comm'n On Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 160-61 (7th
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challenge to an attorney's advertisement concerning contingency fee arrangements
that claimed clients would not be responsible for any fees unless the claim had a
successful resolution, when in actuality the client would be responsible for certain
court costs regardless." 6 The Supreme Court noted that it was "commonplace" for
the general public to assume that the terms "fees" and "costs" were (and are, in their
ordinary usage) interchangeable, and thus the advertisement was misleading." 7
Because the Court believed the potential to mislead was so high in Zauderer, it did
not require further proof."I However, physicians in informed consent cases would
likely need to look to the Court's Colgate recommendation that the parties provide
further proof of the misleading effect of the speech by surveying the public's
opinion.119
This jurisprudence gives context to and provides for a variety of considerations
regarding the truthful and not misleading standard. First, it insists that the court
look to the setting in which the speech occurs and the relationship between the
particular parties. The more imbalanced the relationship, or the more power or
responsibility held by the speaker (versus the hearer), the more likely it is that the
court should look closely at whether the information involved could be seen as
misleading. Additionally, this determination concerning the misleading nature of
the information can be proved in court by evidence that the information itself has,
in fact, misled a significant segment of the population.
D. Preventing Problematic Emotional Appeals Under the Akron, Danforth,
and Thornburgh precedents
While the Court has explicitly held that a state can express its preference for
childbirth over abortion through mandatory disclosures in Casey and has overruled
the precedential cases that limited these disdosures to medically relevant ideas that
are designed to inform rather than convince,2 there is still some role for these
considerations in the truthful and not misleading analysis. In both Thornburgh and
Akron, the Court struck down abortion informed consent statutes as violations of a
woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion, reasoning that those laws
created an undue burden on the woman by intending to persuade her to choose to
carry her child to term, rather than informing her about her particular procedure. 2'
In several pre-Casey cases, the Court noted that these laws implicated physician
Cir. 1977) (holding in part that egg industry should not have been required to include in any future
statements information that many medical experts believe that increased consumption of cholesterol
may increase the risk of heart disease).
116 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652-53.
117 Id. at 652.
118 Id.119 See id. (quoting Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at 391-92).
2 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-873, 882 (1992).
121 See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 758, 760, 772
(1986); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 435, 452 (1983).
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free speech rights, and many times explicitly cited a concern that too much
regulation and too much compelled speech could place the physician in an
"undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket." 122
While Casey technically overruled these cases, aspects of their analysis can be
helpful when considering the truthful and not misleading standard. The legislature
may be allowed to mandate disclosures that go outside the traditional informed
consent and medical context, but this does not change the fact that these mandates
are governed by the truthful and not misleading standard. Akron and Thornburgh
both offer helpful insights into when persuasion by the state to forgo an abortion
may become misleading. Indeed, many scholars have drawn this line where the
information imposes an emotional element "that serves no purpose other than to..
. persuade."'23 Many aspects of mandatory disclosure informed consent statutes
contain information that is not only medically irrelevant, but also can be misleading
to a woman by arousing a certain emotional response.
This line of reasoning is applicable when considering the physician's
professional role and free speech rights and should be considered under the truthful
and not misleading standard. Physicians are ethically and legally bound to provide
services that "hold[] the best interests of the patient as paramount." 124 Thus, while
the state can mandate certain disclosures and regulate aspects of the physician-
patient relationship, information that has no relevance to a patient's decision other
than to persuade by eliciting a negative emotional response could be considered
misleading and violate the physician's free speech rights.
E. Revisiting the Issue ofDeference
While the Casey precedent and subsequent cases seem to allow a large amount
of deference to the state legislatures regarding the information that can be
considered truthful, this standard of review will face challenges in light of recent
Supreme Court and lower court decisions. The Supreme Court itself partially
reopened this debate with its decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. 2 ' There, the
Court renewed and restated the well known rule that "[t]he First Amendment
requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates 'a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys' . . . . [and]
[c]ommercial speech is no exception."1 26 In Sorrell, the Supreme Court made clear
that even state regulations of commercial speech must be scrutinized-a court
cannot just entirely defer to the legislature's judgment. 127
" See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976).
1'3 Suter, supra note 8, at 48 (emphasis added).
124Opinion 10.015-The Patient-Physician Relationship, supra note 104.
" Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).




This is exactly what the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals focused on in its
December 2014 decision in Stuart v. Camnitz, which marked the first victory for
proponents of physician free speech against state regulation of informed consent
measures. 2 ' The Fourth Circuit specifically noted that the state's interest must be
only a starting point, that professionals "do not leave their [free] speech rights at
the office door," and that state regulations that limit the freedom of speech must
pass a level of constitutional scrutiny that requires them to be drawn to a state
interest and be proportional to the burden placed upon the speech.'29 The Fourth
Circuit compared the state's regulation to the purposes and requirements of
traditional informed consent and found that the North Carolina statue seriously
deviated from these with no counterbalancing state interest to explain why." The
state was allowed to express its preference, but once it "commandeer[ed] the
doctor-patient relationship" to do so, the law moved outside of the state's interest
and subverted the patient's expectations and relationship of trust with her doctor.'
The Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari in this case in June 2015.132 The
Fourth Circuit's decision in Camnitz and the Supreme Court's subsequent action
could serve to revitalize the courts' important role in scrutinizing the relationship
between a state's interest and a burden on speech rather than entirely deferring to
the legislature's judgments on these issues.
III. REMOVING THE STRAIGHTJACKET: HOW TO DEFINE THE TRUTHFUL
AND NONMISLEADING STANDARD TO RESPECT PHYSICIAN FREE SPEECH
RIGHTS
In the aftermath of Casey, lower courts around the country have been faced
with deciding when a state can and cannot regulate the interaction between a
physician and a woman seeking an abortion. It is rather unsurprising that the Casey
decision's quick disposal of the issue and statement that truthful and nonmisleading
disclosures will survive constitutional scrutiny has led to some confusion among
lower courts and to varying treatment of this standard across the country. However,
as the laws regulating abortion-provider and patient interactions continue to
become more detailed and specific, it is almost inevitable that the constitutionality
of mandated informed consent provisions in abortion procedures will make their
way to the Supreme Court or to lower federal courts. When the issue does arise,
those deciding the case should ensure the protection of both the state's interest and
the physician's free speech rights by looking into the mandated disclosures and
ensuring they comply with the truthful and not misleading standard.
" See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 256 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (mem.)
(2015).
'2'Id. at 251.
130 Id. at 252.
1 Id. at 253.
132 See Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (mern.) (2015) (denying certiorari).
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First, the court should determine whether the information contained within the
mandatory disclosures fits within the framework and purposes of general informed
consent law. Under this, disclosures should relate to risks of the proposed
treatment, the viable alternative treatments, and the likely outcomes in the absence
of treatment. 133 Disclosures should also be complete, noting both the risks of
undergoing the procedure (proceeding with the abortion) and of declining the
procedure (proceeding with the pregnancy). The court should use definitions and
jurisprudence from other healthcare contexts to ensure that the mandated
disclosures contain information that conforms to the truthful and not misleading
standard. Information should contain up-to-date clinical findings and explain why
there is potentially a lack of conclusive evidence on a certain treatment option if
necessary. Disclosures should also reflect scientific consensus.
Additionally, courts should draw inspiration from case law concerning false
advertising and commercial and professional speech by looking to the surrounding
context of both the speech and the relationship in which the speech occurs. A court
should consider the actual effect the information has and whether a significant
number of the affected population found the disclosure misleading. Finally, courts
should consider the purpose of including the mandated information and the
emotional effect the information will have on the patient. If certain information is
not relevant for any reason but to upset the patient and persuade her to forego the
procedure, it should be ruled misleading under the Casey standard.
While the state certainly has the power to regulate these disclosures and to
ensure that a woman's choice is informed, it should not do so by infringing on the
free speech rights of physicians who provide abortions. By taking these four
categories of ideas into consideration, courts will retain their constitutional duty to
oversee and review the fact-finding of legislatures. Additionally, they will take the
physician out of a straitjacket, protect the doctor's fundamental right to freedom of
speech, and contribute to better medical care.
CONCLUSION
Almost fifteen years after Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter announced
in Casey that "[liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt," 13 4 and more
than forty years after the Court's initial recognition of a woman's fundamental right
to receive an abortion in Roe v. Wade,'35 there has been more legislation and
litigation related to abortion services than ever before. Much of this legislation
relates to restrictions upon those physicians providing abortions, and new
challenges to these laws in the court system assert the rights of these physicians. 136
133 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787- 88 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
134 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
135 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding in part that the right to privacy under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extended to a woman's decision to have an abortion).
36 See, e.g., Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177, 1230-31 (W.D. Wis. 1997).
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Specifically, as state legislatures have successfully enacted laws mandating that
physicians disclose certain information to a woman seeking an abortion as a part of
obtaining her informed consent, these doctors have begun to challenge the laws as
infringing upon their freedom of speech as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 137
While the Supreme Court disposed of one of these free speech infringement
challenges in Casey, it did so in a manner that provided future courts with little
guidance. 13' All the Court afforded to the matter was the following:
[t]o be sure, the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak
are implicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine,
subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State. We
see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the
physician provide the information mandated by the State here. 139
The only limit the Court placed on the state's power was the requirement that
information involved be both truthful and not misleading."4 Since this decision,
numerous states have enacted a variety of informed consent statutes requiring the
dispersal of a wide-range of information to patients seeking abortions, some
requiring more specific information than others. 14 1
While many of these statutes have come under fire as violating physician's free
speech rights because information they contain is either not truthful or is
misleading, physicians have seen very little success pursuing these claims in court.
This is largely due to the fact that Casey and many subsequent courts have been
hesitant, or unable, to look within the information contained in the mandatory
disclosures and determine what meets the truthful and not misleading standard.
However, in the wake of Camnitz,142 the issue of adequately protecting physician
free speech rights under the Casey standard has become more important than ever.
This Note has attempted to provide context and criteria to aid the courts in these
determinations by looking to traditional informed consent principles, other areas of
health law and healthcare, and the jurisprudence surrounding other areas of
compelled speech and false advertising. By taking these factors into consideration,
courts will be better able to protect both a state's interest in adequately and
accurately informing patients and promoting life and a physician's constitutional
right to freedom of speech.
137 See supra note 4.
138 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
139 Id. (citations omitted).
" See id. at 882, 884.
141 See Kaidin Moredock, Note, "Ensuring So Grave A Choice Is Well Informed" The Use of
Abortion Informed Consent Laws to Promote State Interests in Unborn Life, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1973, 1983-84 (2010).
142 Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (mem.) (2015).
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